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Agricultural science and farm-based technologies have been important forces behind the 
dramatic rise in agricultural production in the industrial world during the 20th century, as well 
as in large portions of the developing world (Stanton, 1998). In the United States, mechanisation, 
improved seeds and breeds, chemical inputs, and other scientifically inspired production 
technologies and techniques are often credited with productivity gains (Dimitri, Effland & 
Concklin, 2005). After the Second World War, the Marshall Plan exported many of these 
technologies and techniques to Europe, along with aspects of the political economy of 
agricultural science and technology. The Green Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s diffused 
new crop and animal husbandry technologies and techniques to developing natio~s. Between 
1950 and 1990, irrigated cropland around the world expanded from 94 million hectares to 
271 million hectares, grain production expanded from 618 million metric tons to 1,938 million 
metric tons, numbers of tractors in use expanded from 6 million to 26 million, commercial 
fertiliser use expanded from just under 5 million metric tons to nearly 27 million metric tons, 
and livestock production also saw dramatic increases (Stanton, 1998). More recently, agricultural 
research and development has turned towards even more sophisticated high-technology 
approaches, including computer- and satellite-monitored precision agriculture and genetically 
engineered (GE) crops and livestock. However, the shift to expensive, high-tech solutions 
raises questions concerning the affordability and appropriateness for smallholder agricultural 
producers who make up the vast majority of producers in the world. 
One pitfall when discussing how agricultural science and technology fosters productivity 
gains is that it is easy to treat science and technology as determining outcomes. Moreover, 
narratives about agricultural science and technology tend to perpetuate ideological agendas and 
fail to capture the conflicts and competing processes that have been present at important 
moments in the historical trajectory (Glenna & Henke, 2014). It is important not to overlook 
the role that institutions and structures play in shaping people's decisions and actions, as well as 
the distribution of beneficial and negative consequences. 
In industrialised countries, science- and technology-driven agricultural industrialisation is 
associated with declines in farm numbers, expansion in farm size and specialisation in production. 
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In the case of the United States, farm policies were often directed at limiting farm number 
decline, but some of those same policies also contributed to agricultural specialisation and 
expansion (Dimitri, Effland & Concklin, 2005). Other industrialised nations have adopted 
similar policies, such as price supports for farmers and regulations directed at reducing negative 
environmental consequences, including soil erosion, water pollution and deforestation (Stanton, 
1998; Potter & Burney, 2002). 
In developing nations, the Green Revolution had similar impacts. The introduction of 
improved crop technologies enhanced production, but it also tended to favour larger and more 
prosperous farmers (Evenson & Gollin, 2003). It is important to recognise that there are debates 
about how science and technology lead to these negative outcomes. For example, Birner and 
Resnick (2010) contend that Green Revolution technologies were scale neutral. Indeed, 
agricultural science and technology do not carry with them any inherent qualities that determine 
outcomes. Yet, it is also important to recognise that political-economic contexts influence the 
agricultural research and development agendas, as well as the adoption and diffusion of the 
products of that agenda. Griliches's (1957) research on the diffusion and adoption of hybrid 
maize in the United States found that private firms strove to promote the new technology to 
the largest farmers, first. It is common sense that a firm could sell as much hybrid maize seed in 
one transaction to a 100-hectare farmer as it could in ten transactions with 10-hectare farmers. 
The same logic would hold for an agricultural extension agent charged with promoting the 
diffusion of seeds or other technologies. Birner and Resnick (2010) concede that agricultural 
political-economic conditions and ideologies shaped outcomes that disadvantaged smallholders. 
The Green Revolution has also been linked to environmental problems (Pretty, Toulmin & 
Williams, 2011) and to mass migrations of rural people to major urban areas in developing 
nations (Araghi, 2000). It has long been assumed by many development proponents that rural-
urban migration is an effective poverty reduction strategy. However, following migration from 
poor rural areas to urban areas that do not have employment opportunities, as was the case with 
the Green Revolution, poverty is transferred, but not reduced (Pingali, 2012). Despite the 
failure of policies to benefit smallholder agriculture, smallholder producers remain prominent 
in many regions of the world, particularly in parts of Asia and Africa. Moreover, in recent years, 
there has been an expansion of smallholders (or what some refer to as peasants), even in many 
industrialised countries (Van der Ploeg, 2009). 
Simultaneously, there has been an emphasis on high-technology approaches to address agri-
food challenges, combined with a reliance on the private sector to generate these high-
technology solutions. The approach has been pursued in both developed and developing 
nations. The rationale for the political-economic shift seems to be premised on two basic ideas. 
The first is that private firms have substantial resources and capabilities that could be harnessed 
to meet social welfare needs (Fuglie & Toole, 2014). The second is that private goods generated 
in the private sector are effectively and efficiently diffused through markets and, indeed, are 
more effective and efficient than are public goods generated by the public sector and distributed 
through educational and government agencies (Block, 2011). Furthermore, in the cases where 
public institutions, like agricultural universities, do generate public goods of potential value, the 
assumption is that this value is not fully realised until those public goods are converted into 
private goods and licensed to private firms (Glenna, Lacy, Welsh & Biscotti, 2007). 
In past decades, agricultural science and technology have contributed to the productivist 
goals of maximising production while seeking the greatest efficiency from inputs. However, 
there have always been tensions and contradictions because the distribution of risks and benefits 
has not been even. Despite these insights, recent shifts in the political economy of agricultural 
science and technology indicate a trend that favours the private sector and global markets, a 
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move that tends to exacerbate some of those underlying and persistent tensions and contradictions. 
We explore these issues by examining how these political-economic shifts are affecting 
agricultural science and technology in industrialised and developing nations. 
Political economy of agricultural research in industrial nations 
Perhaps one of the earliest examples of focusing on high-technology, private sector approaches 
was the development of hybrid corn in the United States in the middle of the 20th century. 
Between the early 1900s and the early 2000s, corn yields increased from an average of 25 
bushels per acre to over 160 bushels per acre (that is, from 17 metric tons per hectare to 108 
metric tons per hectare) (Ramey, 2010). Although it is often hailed as a great scientific and 
technological breakthrough, Kloppenburg (2004) and Berlan and Lewontin (1986) argue that 
hybridisation was chosen less for its contribution to yield than for providing a kind of biological 
patent that would attract the private sector's investment in plant breeding. Because it is not 
possible to achieve the same yields each year from saved hybrid corn seed, farmers needed to 
purchase seed each year. Berlan and Lewontin (1986) argue that the same yields could have 
been achieved without hybridisation. To support their claim, they note that corn was not bred 
for yield prior to the emergence of hybridisation. They also observe that wheat yields increased 
even faster than corn, but without hybridisation, between 1937 and 1945. They further note 
that increased corn yields coincided with mechanisation, crop rotation, fertilisers and public 
subsidies for production. The key point is that an ideological shift towards favouring the private 
sector's investment in agricultural science and technology development emerged in the middle 
of the 20th century, and that an ideology. of privatisation contributed to the development of 
hybrid corn because of its built-in intellectual property protection, as distinct from the public 
availability of open-pollinated corn. 
A series of policies in the USA led to more rigorous intellectual property protections for 
US crops. For example, the 1930 Plant Patent Act provided patent-like protection to asexually 
propagated plants, the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act gave patent-like protection to sexually 
propagated plants, and the 1980 Supreme Court decision, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, allowed the 
patenting of novel life forms (Busch, Lacy, Burkhardt & Lacy, 1991; Kloppenburg, 2004). 
Furthermore, since the adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States, many other 
industrial countries have adopted similar policies (OECD, 2003; Lacy et al., 2014). This has 
been an important development in agriculture because farmers had always been able to save a 
portion of their crop to replant the next season. Patent protection changed that. However, the 
political-economic reasoning is that this transformation is justified because the private sector 
will have a greater incentive to invest in agricultural research and development if it can secure 
patent protection. 
Private sector investments in agricultural science and technology research did increase 
between 1981 and 2000. In 1981, in OECD nations, the public sector contributed US$8,339.8 
million and the private sector invested US$6,478.4 million, which amounts to 44% of the total. 
By 2000, the private share of agricultural science and technology research had risen to 54%, 
US$12,184.5 million from private sources and US$10,267.6 million from public sources. 
Information relating to the private investments in agricultural science and technology was not 
available for all nations in 1981. By 2000, the private share of agricultural science and technology 
research investments amounted to 39% (Alston, Andersen, James & Pardey, 2010, p. 144). 
It appears, at first glance, that higher private sector investments are positive. Private agri-
food businesses have substantial scientific expertise and resources that can be mobilised to 
improve agricultural production, which may contribute to more food availability and lower 
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food costs. However, greater investments from the private sector have not yielded the same 
levels of agricultural innovation across nations (Fuglie et al., 2012), and the impacts have not 
been the same across all crops. To explain the variation in impacts, Glenna, Shortall and 
Brandl (2015) compared crop yields in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Ireland. They point out that the private sector tends to invest in crops that have intellectual 
property protections, such as patents or hybridisation, which enable the holder to exclude 
others from using those private goods. These crops include maize, canola, rice and soybeans. 
Public goods, by contrast, can reasonably be accessed by anyone. Before hybridisation, and 
before it became possible to patent genetically engineered (GE) crops, seeds were 
predominantly treated as public goods. Today, GE crops and hybrid crops are treated as 
private property, while open-pollinated crops that are not GE or hybrid, such as wheat and 
barley, continue to be treated as public goods. 
One of Glenna, Shortall and Brandi's (2015) findings is that hybrid crops and GE crops had 
yield increases in the USA over the last three decades. However, open-pollinated crops, like 
wheat, saw a decline in yield growth over the same time period. They argue that this outcome 
is likely because intellectual property protections enticed private sector investments in improving 
GE crops and hybrid crops, whereas the private sector considered open-pollinated crops to be 
a risky investment. By contrast, Germany has banned GE crops, even though it does have 
hybrid maize. Germany had modest increases in multiple crops, including wheat. They argue 
that this is likely because Germany emphasises the enhancement of public goods, even from 
research that is conducted in the private sector. 
This outcome raises concerns because it indicates that, in the absence of strong government 
policies to promote public-goods research, the private sector tends to invest in research that 
yields private goods. However, there are many food and agricultural problems, including 
concerns over water management and environmental protection, for which privatisation is not 
conducive to generating a solution. Glenna, Shortall and Brandl (2015) conclude, therefore, 
that many agri-food challenges require public-goods research and that the increasing emphasis 
on private goods-may inhibit the broad innovations needed to address global agricultural and 
food problems. 
A second problem related to the increasing reliance on private sector research funding and 
the trend in generating more private goods is that intellectual property protections may restrict 
agricultural research at universities and, therefore, may be stifling agricultural innovations 
(Glenna, Tooker, Welsh and Ervin, 2015). In the USA, where GE crops are widespread, a 
group of public sector entomologists submitted two letters in 2009 to the Environmental 
Protection Agency claiming that intellectual property restrictions were preventing them from 
doing research on the efficacy and environmental impacts of GE crops. Glenna, Tooker, Welsh 
and Ervin (2015) conducted a survey of those entomologists and found that 31% claimed that 
their research had been hindered by an industry partner; and nearly 59% said that there is 
research on the efficacy or environmental impacts on GE crops that they would like to conduct, 
if it were not for the intellectual property restrictions that prevented such research. One 
respondent reported that research findings were suppressed. The authors conclude that there is 
conflict between public and private sector scientists, that current policy arrangements have not 
removed obstacles to undertaking important research, and that the integrity of the regulatory 
review process may even be in question. Moreover, they claim that these findings support 
arguments that strict intellectual property protections are hindering innovation (Glenna, 
Tooker, Welsh and Ervin, 2015). 
There are limits to the generalisability of the entomologist study. First, it was a small 
sample. Second, the sample focused exclusively on entomologists who do applied research. 
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However, their findings support those from other research. For example, Lei, Juneja and 
Wright (2009, p. 36) found in a survey of agricultural biologists in the University of California 
system that a majority of the scientists concluded 'that patenting impedes the progress of 
research'. In the same vein, Schimmelpfennig, Pray and Brennan (2004) found that 
concentration in the seed industry has been linked to a reduction in research intensity in the 
agricultural biotechnology field. 
Glenna and Cahoy (2009) explain that, since GE crop research expanded in the 1980s, 37 
companies have secured patents on GE corn and 118 companies have secured patents on non-
com GE crops. However, through buyouts and strategic alliances, just three companies now 
control 85% of patents on GE corn, and just three companies control nearly 70% of patents on 
non-corn GE crops (Glenna & Cahoy, 2009, p. 122). These findings raise questions about how 
competitive the market is for agricultural seeds. The findings also lend support to the claims that 
strict intellectual property protections are inhibiting innovation, since concentration in the seed 
industry is likely to enhance the power of the large seed companies, which they can use to 
control the types of research that university scientists are able to conduct. 
Political economy of agricultural research in developing nations 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, promoting increases in agricultural production has 
been a preoccupation of many agricultural science and technology programmes. Specifically, 
the emphasis on agricultural productivity in developing countries at the international level came 
by way of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which 
evolved into several commodity-specifj.c affiliated research programmes, including the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), International Centre for the Improvement of 
Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT) and later the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). 
From the outset CGIAR grew out of the partnerships created during the development of the 
Green Revolution, particularly between the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Ford Foundation (Shaw, 2009). 
Officially founded in 1971, CGIAR's focus was on increasing production of staple foods, 
with an implicit goal of focusing on the production of international public goods that 'are 
non-exclusive in access and non-rival in use, and have widespread applicability beyond 
national boundaries' (Shaw, 2009, p. 88). A large part of CGIAR's work has focused on 
improved crop varieties. The mandate has shifted noticeably over the past 40 years, moving 
from solely focusing on food productiOn to focusing on the environment, biodiversity and 
policy improvement. Shaw (2009, p. 93) also maintains that funding to CGIAR is increasingly 
restricted, meaning donors limit how and where the money can be spent, a situation that 
'threatens the integrity and functioning' of CGIAR as a system for coordinating research and 
funding. CGIAR funding continues to be dominated by the industrialised countries. The 
developing nations that stand to gain the most from CGIAR research contribute only 5% of 
the budget, which in its entirety stood at approximately US$430 billion in 2006 (Shaw, 2009, 
p. 92). Thus, despite being the intended target of agricultural research, CGIAR is not 
financed or managed primarily by these countries. In addition, CGIAR recognises the limited 
pace and scale at which the outcomes of their research have been adopted by farmers. They 
are now working with private foundations, including Gates and Rockefeller, to increase the 
dissemination of their work. However, the influence of private philanthropists is not without 
its downsides. The Gates Foundation is third only to the USA and the World Bank in 
financial contributions to the CGIAR. By emphasising high-technology and private sector 
solutions, Glenna, Brandl and Jones (2015) argue, the Gates Foundation's impact on the 
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CGIAR research agenda is similar to the impact that private firms are having on public sector 
research organisations in OECD nations. 
At the national level, with heavy influence from development programmes emanating from 
industrialised countries, especially the United States, most developing countries have some 
type of National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI). However, these publicly funded 
agricultural research and development institutions, along with agricultural extension and 
investment in production systems, have experienced a general weakening since the 1970s 
(Collinson, 2001; Pretty, Toulmin & Williams, 2011). NARis, like the CGIAR consortium, 
have historically been commodity focused and discipline based in their research agendas 
(Collinson, 2001). In addition, much of the university agricultural curriculum and education 
and, by association, agricultural extension services, has been based on a W estem curriculum 
which, many argue, fails to be relevant to the context of developing countries, particularly for 
smallholder farmers. This is because smallholders tend to operate multi-enterprise systems, with 
no one commodity being the primary focus (Collinson, 2001). When agricultural research and 
extension focus solely upon one commodity (such as rice or wheat or milk), the real needs of 
smallholders - to manage a variety of commodities - is largely ignored. 
Smallholders and agricultural science and technology 
Focusing on smallholder farmers, whether in industrialised or developing nations, is important 
because they continue to represent the vast majority of farm producers. According to an analysis 
by the United States Census of Agriculture, around 12% oflarge farms (annual sales exceeding 
US$250,000) account for 84% of the value of agricultural production (Hoppe & Banker, 2010, 
p. iv). However, that means that there are still approximately 1.5 million small and medium-
sized farmers in the USA. Although these farmers may not be making substantial contributions 
to overall production, Lobao and Meyer (2004) contend that, for these smaller operators, 
farming still accounts for a substantial portion of their household livelihood strategy. In other 
words, when agricultural research and development focuses on high-technology and market-
based approaches to increasing productivity, it may be ignoring the specific needs of farmers 
who still provide important social and economic contributions. 
Smallholders are located throughout the world and, in fact, smallholders have actually 
increased in the past few decades in both industrialised and developing nations (Van der 
Ploeg, 2008). Van der Ploeg (2008) admonishes much of the existing literature for separating 
peasants into two geographical categories - industrialised and developing countries - and 
then applying different theories and concepts to these two groups. Despite this rebuke, much 
of the recent literature focuses on Asia and the Pacific, or Africa. In part, this is because some 
90% of the world's one billion global poor live on small farms (Birner & Resnick, 2010, 
p. 1442) and are largely located in developing countries. For example, it is estimated that 
about 87% of the world's 500 million small farms (less than 2 ha) are in Asia and the Pacific 
region (Thapa, 2009, p. 1). In Africa, agriculture accounts for 65% offull-time employment, 
25-30% of GDP and over half of total export earnings (IFPRI, 2004, p. 2), and it underpins 
the livelihoods of over two-thirds of Africa's poor (Pretty, Toulmin & Williams, 2011). 
Thus, when discussing the tensions and contradictions surrounding smallholders and 
agricultural science and technology, much, though not all, of our discussion is limited to 
smallholders in developing countries. 
While the conventional definition of 'smallholder' in developing nations is farming less than 
2 hectares ofland (Hazell, Poulton, Wiggins & Dorward, 2007), other definitions of smallholders 
extend to farmers with limited resources, including capital, labour and skills. This is important 
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to bear in mind in terms of thinking about the relevance of agricultural science and technology. 
Smallholders generally feed their households and, to varying degrees, may sell a portion of their 
production in the marketplace. Despite the broad application of the label, smallholders represent 
a diverse group, with some evidence of growing disparities between smallholders in terms of 
land and asset holdings (Jayne, Mather & Mghenyi, 2010; Ransom, 2015). 
Smallholder is, of course, a contested category. Many view smallholders as an obstacle to 
change and predict they will disappear as economic development accelerates (see Collier & 
Dercon, 2014). Others view smallholders as providing abundant opportunities, particularly in 
terms of environmental sustainability and economic opportunity (Van der Ploeg, 2008; Pretty, 
Toulmin & Williams, 2011). Our interests are less in debating the role of smallholders and more 
in recognising how the new trends in agricultural research and development are failing to meet 
the needs of a large number offarmers in the world. Generally, high-technology solutions being 
developed in the private sector, such as new biotechnologies, are unlikely to benefit smallholders. 
Thapa (2009) observes that the development of private GE crops is generally disadvantageous 
to small farmers because private research companies lack incentives to address small farn1ers' 
concerns. Similarly, Muzari, Gatsi and Muvhunzi (2012) argue that some of the most important 
crop improvements that need to happen for smallholders are 'in situ' (i.e., in the field) where 
interbreeding of traditional crops with varieties that have improved characteristics would be 
beneficial. But the authors observe there is little to no interest from commercial seed enterprises 
in such research and development, because the profits are too low, even though this could 
improve productivity for smallholders (Muzari, Gatsi & Muvhunzi, 2012, p. 75). 
Of those interested in the role smallholders could play in creating a more sustainable 
agri-food system, there are several who believe in the opportunity to create sustainable or agro-
ecological intensification (Pretty, Toulmin & Williams, 2011; Nelson & Coe, 2014). For 
example, in a study of rice production in northern Ghana, Glenna et al. (2012) found that, 
given the right policies to provide inputs and guaranteed markets, smallholder rice farmers were 
able to dramatically improve rice yields using conventionally improved rice varieties. They also 
note that such efforts to enhance productivity of smallholders were being hampered by World 
Bank policies that discourage public investments aimed at supporting' smallholder farms. 
Gender and agricultural science and technology 
Alongside the continuing presence of smallholders has been the so-called feminisation of 
agriculture. Women in low-income countries have typically been involved in a range of 
livelihood strategies that include growing, processing and preparing food (Ransom, Wright & 
Bain, forthcoming). However, these roles are also changing as social and economic forces 
transform the agricultural sector in many places. Agriculture is becoming feminised, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa, where women are increasingly responsible for the farm as men exit from 
the sector to migrate to urban areas in search of paid work, or as a result of involvement in civil 
wars and conflicts, or deaths and illnesses from HIV I AIDS. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011) have 
highlighted that, despite the fact that women play a central role in food production in most 
developing countries, only one in four agricultural researchers in sub-Saharan Africa and one in 
three in Latin America are female. The authors elaborate that, although male researchers can 
address the needs of women farmers, 'the lack of gender balance among agricultural scientists 
diminishes the likelihood that the specific needs of rural women will be met' (Meinzen-Dick et 
al., 2011, p. 49). This lack also means that 'women's voices are less heard in critical, often male-
dominated, policy debates and decision making processes' (p. 50). 
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The feminisation of agriculture is also relevant to the topic of technology adoption. Agricultural 
technologies that were created, but never adopted, litter the agricultural development landscape. 
There is a long line of technologies that were either not perceived as appropriate by smallholders 
and/ or the policies that were needed to support adoption were never implemented (Birner & 
Resnick, 2010; Muzari, Gatsi & Muvhunzi, 2012). There has been a renewed focus on 
agricultural development in the past decade, and with this focus has come renewed attention to 
the factors that facilitate technology adoption among smallholders. Factors affecting technology 
adoption include assets, vulnerability and institutions. Generally, smallholders with limited 
material and non-material (e.g., education) assets will be less likely to adopt asset-intensive 
technologies. So, for the poorest farmers, technologies with low-asset requirements are more 
likely to be adopted (Muzati, Gatsi & Muvhunzi, 2012). A high degree of vulnerability is 
identified among smallholders because they have very little protection from climatic or market 
fluctuations. Generally, this means technologies should be perceived by smallholders as low risk 
(Collison, 2001; Muzari, Gatsi & Muvhunzi, 2012). Finally, an assortment of institutions, 
including financial, insurance and information dissemination, are viewed as important, but 
historically absent or ineffectual at working with smallholders in developing countries. Many of 
these institutions also have a history of gender bias, primarily only willing to work with men, 
which is problematic as more and more women can be identified as smallholders (Doss, 2001). 
Moreover, government policies and investment, particularly in Africa, have increasingly come 
under scrutiny. On average, African countries spend 4-5% of national budgets on agriculture, 
compared to 8-14% in Asia (Fan, Johnson, Saurkar & Makombo, 2008, p. 2). 
Conclusion 
Scientific research and technology have made great contributions to agricultural productivity 
gains over the last century. Yet, these gains have come with costs, most notably social and 
economic inequality and ecological problems. These outcomes have led some commentators to 
highlight the contradictions and tensions of relying on scientific research and new technologies 
to solve productivity problems while paying too little attention to questions of equity and 
ecological sustainability. Although the productivist approach has never been free of challenges, 
recent shifts in the political economy of agricultural science have served to exacerbate some of 
those underlying and persistent tensions and contradictions. 
In general, the share of private funding for agri-food research and development in industrialised 
and developing nations has grown in relation to public funding. Although there are benefits to 
having more investments from firms and private philanthropists in research, these investments 
tend to be directed at securing private goods at the expense of public goods and favour larger 
commodity producers and market-based approaches over smallholders and collective agro-
ecological approaches. As a result, research agendas directed at generating scientific knowledge 
and technologies more appropriate to smallholder farmers in industrialised and developing 
nations tend to be underfunded. These missed opportunities may be undermining smallholders' 
abilities to meet their own needs and to produce a sufficient and sustainable food supply for 
their nations and the world. 
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